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ABSTRACT 
BARBARA KOSNY: The Distinctiveness of the European Union’s Influence on Latin 
America: European Values, Governance, and Integration 
(Under the direction of Milada Vachudova) 
 
The European Union’s priorities and capabilities in international relations and 
security have changed considerably since the end of communism.  They did not only 
develop as a consequence of internal policy developments but also from external 
opportunities and expectations.  Overtime, it has become evident that the EU exerts 
substantial influence over world politics even though it has limited military power at its 
disposal. Instead, it relies on other tools that help build the attractiveness and success of 
its norms and values. By examining the case studies of Honduras and Cuba I argue that 
the European Union has a new opportunity to be a leading political player in Latin 
America and to promote itself as a more imperative actor in world politics. The EU’s 
normative power, gives it sufficient leverage to positively influence Latin America 
through: European norms and values, good governance, and regional integration. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new world order, the 
European Union has grown to have a new, unique, and powerful presence in Latin 
America. The global power struggle during the Cold War was ideological, particularly 
contingent upon military power as opposed to normative influence. The end of the Soviet 
era halted the global arms race, and prompted a change in the EU’s foreign policy goals 
and strategic vision. This global power shift allowed the EU to expand its influence 
beyond economic ties on the European continent and into previously politically 
inaccessible regions such as Latin American countries. As a result of the newly enlarged 
scope of influence, the EU’s power and capabilities were able to develop through a 
combination of new opportunities and expectations. 
The end of the Soviet era provided the window that the EU needed to expand its 
political influence into regions that had been historically under U.S. patronage. It also 
meant the end of the global dominance of military persuasion, a brand of power exercised 
by the U.S. over regions like Latin America. As the EU realized the importance of 
speaking with one voice, it broadened its position within the international setting into 
becoming a more relevant and influential power. Economic integration was already a 
priority in EU foreign relations, but the EU needed to expand its influence. However, 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) lacked sufficient cohesion and support 
from EU’s members, making it difficult to consider the EU a viable military power. As a 
result of this lack of common position, the EU focused its power on other priorities. In 
addition, with the introduction of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 
1997 and the declaration of the European Security Strategy in 2000, it was evident that 
the EU was strengthening its influence.1 Accordingly, the EU’s global influence began to 
augment, and has since further increased, permitting it to be a new and distinctive actor in 
foreign relations. 
Although its military capabilities are minimal, the EU seeks to augment its role on 
the world stage by using ‘soft’ instruments that can be best explained through the lens of 
social constructivist theory. Here I will agree with John McCormick’s stance that, “if 
hard power rests on the use of military or economic resources to force or coerce an 
outcome, then soft power rests on a state working to achieve its goals through the appeal 
of its ideals.”2 Building on this stance, I will measure influence in world politics through 
the ability to enact and leverage change through the appeal of certain ideals.  According 
to Franck Debié3, the EU now has the capacity to influence individual nation states—as a 
normative power and as a new kind of international actor.4 The EU’s distinctiveness is 
composed of its use of normative power in three distinct areas: the propagation of 
European norms and values, good governance, and regional integration. 
In order to provide evidence for the nature and scope of the EU’s normative 
influence in Latin America, I have chosen to concentrate on case studies of recent events 
in Cuba and Honduras. According to social constructivist theory, both Cuba and 
Honduras will eventually assimilate towards EU values and norms if the presence of the 
                                                            
1 McCormick, Understanding the Euroepan Union 2005 
2 McCormick, The European Superpower 2007, 14 
3 The Executive Director of the Chirac Foundation 
4 Debié 18 September 2009 
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EU as a ‘social actor’ in the region remains consistent.  If the EU had not been consistent 
in its policies and assertive in its guidance, then domestic and foreign policy in Cuba and 
Honduras would have been different in two ways.  First, open dialogue between rogue 
states and democratic states would be primarily focused on U.S. hegemonic presence. 
Second, the influence of social actors would not be of as great of an importance, 
preventing the gains in democratic building that those actors have made possible. 
EU’s distinct foreign policy initiatives reflect three core policy ideas: European 
values and principles, global governance, and regional integration. These three concepts 
are essential to the EU’s growing influence in Latin America.  Firstly, the EU goal of 
‘social cohesion’ guides EU foreign policy. This EU policy goal includes norms of 
‘liberty/freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, and ‘rule of law,’ and the primary 
external reference points for these norms are the Council of Europe’s 1950 ECHR , the 
CoE’s 1997 Convention on Human Rights, and the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights. Secondly, the ‘Civil Society Dialogue’ guides EU policy. The details of 
what constitutes good governance include the participation of civil society in order to 
encourage openness and transparency, as well as to facilitate democratic participation. 
Lastly the concept of regional integration has become prominent in EU foreign policy, 
specifically goals managed under EU trade relations and economic integration goals.  
This thesis will be divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, I will discuss 
how international relations scholars treat power, along with a discussion of how social 
constructivist theory defines power and thereby influences the international system. In the 
second chapter I will discuss the EU historically as a global actor, including relations 
during and after the Cold War. In the third chapter, I will provide evidence for how the 
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EU has successfully asserted its influence in Latin America. I will explore three areas 
where the EU has had a significant impact: European norms and values, good 
governance, and regional integration. This will show how the EU has exerted its 
normative power to influence the outcomes of recent events in Honduras and Cuba.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER I: POWER WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
    Before further expanding on the EU’s power abilities as a world leader, I will 
discuss power in the international system itself. The idea that power is the capacity of a 
state to enact change is relevant to the post-modern international system. Secondly, I will 
use the theoretical framework of social constructivism to highlight my claim of the EU as 
a distinctive power and new kind of international actor in the global context.                              
1.1 Theoretical conceptualization of power 
My focus is to demonstrate how the EU is a distinctive progenitor of change in power 
relations and a new kind of international actor.  I will expand on John McCormick’s 
claims that the most powerful of actors will be those that create opportunities. Therefore, 
instead of the original military-centric bi-polar, world system, there is less emphasis 
today on military and ideological competition and more on economic and political 
competition. Accordingly, I will introduce a new and distinctive way of viewing power: a 
‘normative’ way based on European values and principles.  These values and principles 
begin with the EU’s post-modern attitudes to government, society and economic structure 
contrasting with the U.S. preference for coercion and unilateralism.5  
   Previously, power was determined through a sizeable military that was able and 
willing to provide protection worldwide.6 Presently, power is correlated to influence. The 
traditional understanding of power is vital to understanding Europe’s growing influence. 
First, according to Kenneth Waltz, power in the international system is a reflection of the 
                                                            
5 McCormick, The European Superpower 2007, 12 
6 McCormick, The European Superpower 2007, 10 
capacity of a state to affect the behavior of another state.7  Previously, power was 
measured through a large military that was capable and willing to provide protection at 
every corner of the globe.8 Power was defined as the capacity of a state to affect 
behavior, relying upon the use of force. It was attained when policy goals had effects that 
were observable and measurable. Specifically, power included a superior firepower, a 
large and productive economy, political and cultural influence, and the ability to pursue 
policy goals on a global scale.9  
The idea that power is the capacity of a state to enact change is relevant also to 
the post-modern international system. John McCormick’s explains this accordingly: “the 
post-modern international system emphasizes markets, trade, and technology, all bound 
together in a new system of interdependence in which force has lost much of its utility, 
and may even be counterproductive: it only sends a provocative message to potential 
adversaries.”10 This post-modern view of the international system gained prominence 
after the fall of communism. During the Cold War period, while Americans were 
investing in weapons, Europeans were investing in education, healthcare, and 
infrastructure. In short, the traditional view of power being comprised of massive military 
spending - routinely quoted as evidence of U.S. power - became more of indication of a 
considerable lack of influence elsewhere. 11 New approaches to the modern political 
world order allow the EU to pursue effective and ‘normative’ power approaches to 
dealing with economic and political issues abroad, making it a distinctive and influential 
                                                            
7 Waltz 2000 
8 McCormick, The European Superpower 2007, 10 
9 Risse 2004 
10 McCormick, The European Superpower 2007, 10 
11 McCormick, The European Superpower 2007, 26 
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global power.                                                                                                                                 
1.2 Introducing power through social constructivism  
Political theorist Alexander Wendt innovated the theoretical understanding that all 
interactions within the international system are socially constructed.12 He challenges 
anarchy as the main instigator of behavior in international actors, stating that actors are 
not simply governed by a self-help system, but their identities and interests are important 
in analyzing how they behave. This profound conceptualization of constructivism claims 
that choices are both historically and socially contingent, questioning original issues of 
identity and interest understood in neoliberalist and neorealist terms.13 In short, norms 
and values are socially constructed as they constitute actor identities and interests, they 
do not simply regulate behavior.14 The social construction of norms, ideas, and 
expectations are of vital importance when analyzing the influence of one social structure 
on another.  Therefore, social constructivist theory can be used to hypothesize that if 
identities and interests are indeed an essential part of the international community, then 
international relations and multilateralism can be effective through common goals, value 
systems and agreements.  
Social constructivism is a lens through which to study European influence in 
Latin America. I will use this theoretical claim as a basis to the understanding of EU 
foreign relations. Social constructivism differentiates itself from other more prominent 
theories by not identifying the self-interest of a state as the basis for theory, as both 
                                                            
12 A. Wendt 1992 
13 Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory 1998, 325 
14 Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory 1998, 324 
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neorealists and neoliberals do.15 Instead, constructivists analyze international relations by 
looking at other elements of the international stage: social constructs - goals, fears, 
cultures, identities, etc. These elements become exceedingly important in an analysis of 
complex relations, such as that of the EU and Latin America. Here, the EU differentiates 
itself from other powers, using distinctive elements of influence to impact Latin America 
through common goals, value systems and agreements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15  A. Wendt 1992, 392 
 CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL PRESENSE OF EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR 
  In these two sections I will give a brief historical background on EU relations 
with Latin America before and after the Cold War. I will further expand upon the EU’s 
normative power and describe it as an accurate characterization of the EU’s central 
foreign policy with emphasis on European values and principles, good governance, and 
regional integration. I use social constructivism to suggest the vital role of identities and 
interests in the international community, and how international relations and 
multilateralism can be effective through European common goals, value systems and 
agreements.  
2.1 EU relations during the Cold War  
The historical significance of the bi-polar world and the impact of the global 
weakening of U.S. power are significant in regards to EU external relations. During the 
Cold War, inter-state relations were largely influenced by U.S.’ hegemonic presence.16 
The economic and political dimension of Europe and its transatlantic relationship with 
the U.S. was based on a conflict of power, interests, and ideology. Often, the U.S. was 
referred to as an indomitable presence and power. This power was a historical 
consequence of the impact of Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt between 1941 (‘The Four 
Freedoms’) and 1948 (UDHR), providing the U.S. a strong international presence.17 At 
first, this power was subject to American principles of freedom and justice; however, the 
normative power of the U.S. quickly developed into a more military-oriented power. This 
                                                            
16 Smith 2003 
17 Manners 2006 
was a consequence of the Soviet Union’s power assertions. During this same time, 
Europe began focusing on the principle of a shared sovereignty. Here, Zaki Laidi of 
Sciences Po in Paris explains, “The sole means of permanently linking the fortunes of 
states that were determined to remain sovereign while simultaneously abdicating part of 
their sovereignty was to have them adhere to common norms, all the more restrictive in 
that they were to be negotiated.”18 
As the years progressed, issues of disagreement between the EU and U.S. placed 
the two regions in opposing corners considering global strategies. As the U.S. began to 
regard Central America as its own sphere of influence, the EU fought to maintain 
influence through economic ties with the region.19 During this time, the EU focused on a 
preference for engagement and partnerships rather than on power and influence.  
Economic and political goals concerning trade, development, EU leverage and 
democratization developed into driving factors.20 Meanwhile, the U.S. became an 
exceedingly controversial influence. Ideological games were creating conflict on a global 
scale. As an example of the severity of the conflict, the U.S. was absent from the San 
Jose Process in 1984, which hoped to ease regional conflicts. Despite the belief by the 
U.S. that the EU should stay out of conflicts in the Americas, the European Community 
insisted on acting as a mediator. From the EU’s perspective, any fight for the developing 
world would be waged through cooperation and partnership. Jean-Paul Marthoz, the 
Chair of the European Institute on Peace and Security Studies, attests that the ‘European 
social mode’ served as an alternative to the superpower games, and that with the extreme 
conservatism of the U.S., the globe placed its hopes in the EU. He further explains, 
                                                            
18 Laidi 2007, 4 
19 McCormick, The European Superpower 2007 
20 H. Mackenstein 2005 
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“Attracted by the European discourse on sustainable development, North-South 
cooperation and human rights and diplomacy, they set up offices in Brussels to lobby the 
various EU institutions.”21 The EU was seen as a distinct and approachable power, 
granting a floor for global discourse and accountability.                                                                  
2.2 EU relations since the end of the Cold War  
As the EU gained prominence as a relevant world actor, the once unchallenged 
hegemonic hold of the U.S. on Latin America decreased. Throughout the 1980’s a range 
of European actors contributed to the emergence of important networks, facilitating social 
and political relations between Europe and Latin America. Numerous aid programs 
followed, and European investment in the economies of larger Latin American countries 
increased.22 Meanwhile, global ideological conflicts continued and the U.S.’s hegemonic 
presence continued its decline. The EU began exerting more of an economic influence.  
Collectively, the EU member states along with the European Commission began to direct 
more than half of all developmental aid towards the developing world. Today, Europe’s 
role in Latin America is notable, and it is evident that the EU differs from more 
traditional powers.23  
The EU seeks the integration of a world order based on the legitimacy of rules, 
the predictability of behavior and the enforceability of accepted principles.24 With the 
introduction of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1997 and the 
declaration of the European Security Strategy in 200025, it was clear that the EU was 
                                                            
21 Marthoz 2008 
22 Crawley 2000 
23 Baybars Karacaovali 2007 
24 Laidi 2007, 3 
25 McCormick, Understanding the Euroepan Union 2005 
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using its normative power to become an integral actor in world politics. It has a 
considerable presence in the global sphere, so much so, in fact, that other international 
actors cannot fail to notice its presence as the world’s largest trading bloc or its 
consequent normative presence.26 Further, European norms transferred into new regions, 
helping to regulate world affairs. States became interested in seeing that the norms linked 
to their own interests and perspectives, for it was becoming difficult to ensure protection 
by traditional means.27 The influence of law on the EU’s international relations was 
conducted through the establishment of legal agreements and cooperation measures. 
These agreements included various summits, trade partnerships and rights. Thus, the EU 
saw its power in shaping international actors by using persuasion, legal agreements, 
dialogue, and positive incentives.28 
Today, the EU has considerable economic influence in Latin America. For the 
2007-2013 periods, EU assistance for the region is expected to amount to € 3 billion, 
while during the same time the European Investment Bank promises to lend up to €2.8 
billion.29 Further, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s report in July of 1999, 
new trade agreements between the EU and Latin America are impressive for both 
multinational companies and U.S. officials as they diminish U.S. hegemony in global 
economic integration. This includes negotiations between Mercosur30’s full members and 
                                                            
26 Smith 2003, 104 
27 Laidi 2007, 7 
28 Smith 2003, 107 
29 See European Union and Latin America, EU Online Portal 
30 Mercosur was created in 1991 and encompasses four Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil,      
Paraguay and Uruguay. 
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the EU member states. Such talks with the EU gave Mercosur additional leverage in 
separate negotiations to NAFTA.31   
According to social constructivist theory, social structures and agents are 
mutually co-determined. Political discourse and the construction of interests and 
preferences both matter.32 Of course, Europe has neither the mandate nor the material 
power to impose norms within Latin America, and is, in any case, unwilling to bear the 
costs of doing so, as I will note in both the case studies of Honduras and Cuba. 
Nevertheless, the EU consistently tries to encourage a focus in Latin America towards 
growth through regional integration, social responsibility through distinct norms and 
values, and what it sees as good governance through diplomacy and foreign policy.33 
According to Augusto Varas34, “Giving precedence to diplomacy over direct intervention 
and fostering a concept of alliance, instead of naked unilateralism, could enable work to 
be carried out around a pragmatic, common agenda, in a hemisphere which, increasingly, 
should be seen as ideologically and politically plural.”35 New attitudes towards the 
modern political world order allow the EU to pursue effective approaches to dealing with 
economic and political issues abroad.  
 
 
31 See European Union and Latin America, EU Online Portal 
32 Risse 2004 
33 Grugal 2004, 608 
34 Associate Researcher, FRIDE 
35 Varas 2008, 6 
 CHAPTER III: IMPACT OF EU ON LATIN AMERICA SINCE THE END OF THE 
COLD WAR 
The end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union allowed new 
actors to gain prominence.36 Scholars now identify the phenomenon and the current 
power scheme in international relations as a “post-American world”. During the Cold 
War, European governments offered solidarity to the U.S., as their superpower patron, in 
exchange for security. This arrangement gave European countries a sense of power, 
without much weight of responsibility. However, now the increasingly unified EU must 
prove its political presence to the world.37 Benita Ferrero-Waldner38 states, “The recent 
history of the EU has shown that countries have everything to gain from cooperating, 
showing solidarity and uniting in their efforts to tackle the challenges of globalization 
together.” This chapter will be divided into three parts. The first part will explore the 
impact of European norms and values in general. The second part will focus on the 
specific norm of good governance; the third will explore the EU’s role in promoting 
regional integration in Latin America. Lastly, Europe’s new role as an essential actor in 
world politics will be evaluated through the case studies of Honduras and Cuba.             
3.1 European values and norms 
The view of Europe as a normative power is reinforced through the sharing of 
European norms and values. Zaki Laïdi39 best describes the situation with these words, 
“Europe, which Europeans often look on as a weak actor with few means, is in reality 
                                                            
36 Katzenstein 2009 
37 Shapiro 2009 
38 European Commissioner for External Relations and Neighbourhood Policy 
39 Senior Research fellow at the Centre d’Etudes Européennes of SciencesPo (Paris) 
perceived as an influential player on the world scene, less on account of its military 
power than on account of the force of its norms.”40 I claim that the EU has moved past 
pure power theory by constructing its foreign relations conditional on certain norms, 
especially those of the European convention on the universal declaration of human 
rights.41  These norms produce compliance by creating focal points in the domestic arena 
and act as instruments to manipulate and constrain the views of other actors.42 According 
to Franck Debié, the Executive Director of the Chirac Foundation, these norms contribute 
to the attractiveness of the EU social model and work to maximize European power as it 
receives global recognition and acceptance.  
Europe’s responsibilities and political priorities are distinctive as they focus on 
human rights, citizenship, economic growth, liberalization, and global and economic 
integration.43 As an example, EU policy priorities towards Latin America are defined in 
the Communication on a ‘Stronger Partnership between the EU and Latin America’.44 
Issues such as drugs, social cohesion, migration and partnerships with civil society actors 
figure prominently in bi-regional dialogues. These social norms both regulate the 
behavior and constitute the identity of social community.45  “Constructivism maintains 
that collective norms and understandings define the basic ‘rules of the game’ in which 
they find themselves in their interactions.”46 It emphasizes norm-guided behavior seen in 
various partnership agreements. As an example, in order to develop closer ties between 
Latin America and the EU, a number of regional cooperation programs have been 
                                                            
40 Laidi 2007, 2 
41 Lister 1997 
42 Checkel 2001, 558 
43 Lister 1997 
44 For details see: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/la/docs/com05_636_en.pdf 
45 Risse 2004 
46 Risse 2004, 163 
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established over the last decade in the areas of social cohesion, territorial cooperation, 
and SME development, financed primarily through the European Regional Development 
Fund.47  
Likewise, democratization is an important aspect of the EU’s foreign policy. 
Firstly, Europe favors democratic countries in external and developmental affairs as 
necessary criteria for relations. The hope is that Latin American countries, as social 
actors, will be influenced by certain democratic norm, and subsequently reproduce and 
reinforce those norms through their daily practices. Towards the end of the 20th century, 
democracy became not just a precedent but a norm in practically every region of the 
world, rule of law and good governance became the first steps towards economic 
transformation and social mobilization. 48 Hence, the norm of democratization along with 
the creation of regional institutions to carry out the norm have led to the total acceptance 
that democracy is the only legitimate form of political organization.  
European norms and values are spread through political, economic and social 
agendas. In 2003, for example, the EU embarked on a set of initiatives based around the 
theme of social inclusion, including research funding, seminars and the creation of a fund 
to provide for the regular exchange of ideas within Latin America, mimicking the EU’s 
own policies. This signifies a change in the role influence can and should have. Briefly, 
the EU has also sought to broaden the social bases of its relationships in and with Latin 
America to include not only elites and governments, but also civil society actors.49  The 
EU’s relationship with Latin America has deepened considerably since the introduction 
                                                            
47 See European Union and Latin America, EU Online Portal  
48 Kisielewski 1 
49 Grugal 2004 
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of aid and developmental policies to Latin America and specifically to its social actors. 
These policies are not only different from the U.S. approach, but they also are a viable 
alternative to U.S. hegemony in the region.50 “Rule-guided behavior differs from 
strategic and instrumental behavior in that actors try to ‘do the right thing’ rather than 
maximizing or optimizing their given preferences.”51 The action of a state, as with the 
EU, cannot be separated from its norms and values which drive the actions of the EU as a 
social actor. 3.2 Good governance 
After the collapse of the communist world, a new way of viewing multilateralism 
developed, focusing on institution building and the promotion of good governance with 
the belief that the social reality of a given state must be constructed through daily 
practices. Constructivism offers an alternate understanding to the relationship between 
state, identity and interest, and the prospects for change in world politics52, allowing for 
my hypothesis that the EU exerts substantial influence in world politics. As European 
norms and values became intertwined in policy goals, an emphasis on governance 
became an integral component of foreign policy.53  
Governance by norms resembles a call to go beyond traditional cooperation 
between states. The EU’s idea of governance is a practical halfway platform between 
traditional intergovernmentalism and world federalism. The EU understands that it is 
only by norms and not by force that it can make its voice heard. It’s preference for norms 
means that the EU, given the lack of alternative, has the greatest interest in defending 
them. This differs from other actors who favor norms when it suits them or when they 
                                                            
50 Grugal 2004 
51 Risse 2004, 163 
52 Hopf 1998 
53 Grugal 2004, 4 
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have proposed them, but who let the norms fade when the situation does not reflect their 
interests.54  
The EU's broadening conceptualization of the good governance agenda is a 
distinctive part of its global agenda. While the World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and the OAS retained a primarily technical perspective on good 
governance initiatives, the EU sought to link a good governance agenda to its political 
reform. Here Richard Young explains, “European policymakers saw as central to the 
E.U.'s distinctive approach the purposive attempt to design and pursue trade-related 
governance measures in a way that facilitated systemic improvements in democratic 
processes.”55 Further, administrative reform programs in Central America were designed 
to compensate for the absence of state authorities in many localities; governance projects 
on state reform created change from within. 
Social constructs such as: goals, fears, cultures, identities, etc., challenge the 
previously existent realist and liberal theoretical assumptions and thus create new 
opportunities for the Latin American countries. They concentrate on the social identities 
of actors as an explanation of their interests and go beyond pure power structures and 
goals. Therefore the approaches to governance of the EU can make a significant 
contribution to international goals of good governance. As Political Scientist Christopher 
Hill has noted: 
“Precisely the kinds of attributes possessed by the European [Union]—the intellectual 
impact of a new model of interstate relations, the disposition of considerable economic 
influence over the management of the international economy, the possession of a vast 
network of contacts and agreements with every region of the international system—are 
those most capable of influencing the very environment which determines whether or 
                                                            
54 Laidi 2007, 4 
55 Youngs 2002, 129 
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not military strength will need to be used.” 56 
EU interests in Latin America exceed simple economic governance and seek to 
embrace social and development issues. John McCormick places a clear emphasis on 
normative influence by stating that “most serious threats to international peace and 
security - including poverty… trade dispute, and public health crises such as the spread of 
HIV and AIDS - have sources that demand non-military solutions.”57 Thus, it becomes 
evident that the EU now lays claim to a set of interests in the region that go beyond 
questions of economic governance to embrace a range of social and development issues. 
Justly, European constructivists emphasize that the EU has the ability to deeply effect 
behavioral practices and act as a vital aspect to democratic socialization and consequently 
of good governance.58  
The influence of the EU has grown from bilateral to multilateral means. Many 
partnerships are evidence of normative influence, such as those between the EU and the 
United Nations concerning development and humanitarian cooperation. The EU is a 
power in global governance, based on the development of policy framework and 
increasing financial contribution to the UN System.59  These common positions hold a 
collective weight that can have more impact in the world. In recent years, the UN has 
come to regard the EU as an important partner in addressing development and 
humanitarian issues.  Further, the EU now extends its governance and norms system by 
being the sole voice to appeal for the creation of a Global Environmental Agency. 
Moreover, the call for global governance has been implemented by the EU in several 
                                                            
56 Smith 2003, 108 
57 McCormick, The European Superpower 2007, 14 
58 Risse 2004 
59 Inoue 2008 
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ways, thus becoming a norm throughout the world. In the WTO, the EU has spoken out 
for a broad agenda to ensure that the opening of new markets and the regulation of these 
markets progress simultaneously by including governance goals. Here, Zaki Laidi states, 
“Norms are not possible without justice.”60 The EU openly recognizes that governance is 
key to a variety of global issues. 
There are many association agreements focusing on the strengthening of regional 
institutions in Central America and the participation of civil society in the process. The 
EU works to use its leverage to enact change through agreements and partnerships. 
Therefore, social constructivist theory can be used to hypothesize that if identities and 
interests are indeed an essential part of the international community, then international 
relations and multilateralism can be effective through common goals, value systems and 
agreements.  
3.3 Regional integration 
Europe must use foreign policy tools, such as regional integration, in order to 
function in the current political atmosphere in which the brief post-Soviet era of 
unrivalled American hegemony has been challenged.61 The EU has a distinctive policy 
and trade influence in Latin America through new regionalism. Latin America was one of 
the first areas where the E.U. combined its trade and foreign policymaking bodies in 
order to facilitate the linking of commercial and political norms.  The emphasis on new 
regionalism, as a process of world-wide integration, is the greater capacity and power of 
the EU’s diplomatic power towards Latin America.  
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The weight of the pressures in favor of global economic integration, and the 
opening of markets in trade and production regimes led to a global political economy that 
reflected the trend towards social and economic integration.62  By the 1990s, it became 
evident that preferential trade deals would no longer be effective. With the rise of 
European identity and a unified sense of social responsibility, European trade negotiators 
were driven towards a new and more practical use of diplomacy. The liberalization of 
European economies and the repositioning of the Europe within a new global political 
economy prompted a realignment of Europe’s goals, making the old European 
instruments of engagement with the developing world no longer viable.63 Seen through 
the theoretical understanding of social constructivism, these trends show the state as no 
longer the sole influence, but as one under the influence of other actors such as national 
governments, firms, or trade interests are deeply embedded in and affected by the social 
institutions in which they act.64  
In order to understand the distinctiveness of European regional and economic 
integration, it is necessary to understand how it differs from U.S. trade and economic 
policies. The EU uses new regionalism as means of displaying what it perceives to be a 
more humane governance model for Latin America.65 On the contrary, U.S. views on 
regional integration stem largely from the justifications of the Breton Woods system. The 
agreement promoted a progressive harmonization of regulations that included 
considerable dependency on the external sector. Today, this dependency factor is evident 
in the regionalist policies of the US. Since the creation of NAFTA in 1994, the 
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negotiations of the U.S. have been mainly ideological —regionalism is seen as a vehicle 
through which to create a mode of liberal economic governance under the steady hand of 
Washington.66  
Further, one of the most significant differences between the EU and the U.S. 
concerning new regionalist constructions is the language employed in discussing the role 
of economic integration. The European model focuses explicitly on terms such as 
‘partnership’, rather than ‘economic agreement’ as used by the United States. Within the 
EU, communicative action acts as a facilitator to the establishment of consensus and 
agreements. Therefore, partnerships are the best ways to promote change and increase 
influence in the region as opposed to strict economic trading. Partnership agreements 
became a crucial aspect to EU development policy beginning in the 1990s.67 Further, the 
EU recognized the adverse political impact of global financial instability. This economic-
political linkage is most developed in Latin America than any other regional initiative.68 
Europe’s view of regionalism is distinctive as it focuses on policies towards 
developing countries that emphasize human rights, citizenship, and poverty reduction 
through regional goals and integration. These policies strengthen European identity and 
promote more active common foreign policies. Thus, new regionalism is conceptualized 
as a stimulus to good governance and responsible development through social networks, 
emphasizing a reliance on civil society to deliver and oversee policy. Regional 
integration is attractive for a number of economic reasons. At the regional level, 
efficiency and competitiveness are often strengthened through commonly agreed upon 
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forms of deregulation. In addition, the effects of regional economies of scale can 
drastically create dynamic effects that work to accelerate economic growth from within.69  
EU interest in Latin America is not confined to short term trade and investment 
deals but rather, it centers on long-term partnerships through programs. The aim of these 
programs is to enhance mutual understanding between the EU and Latin America through 
Latin-American regional integration.70  One example of a successful program is the 
Mercosur treaty, which works to improve a country’s global market position by placing 
production sites within a state’s geographical boundaries71, differentiating itself from 
former U.S. dependency models of integration.  These kinds of association agreements 
between the EU and Latin America help develop trade, research, democracy and human 
rights.  The relationship with Mercosur, in particular, is evolving towards a process of 
integration modeled on the EU. The effectiveness of the model has been a huge precedent 
for regional programs and treaties worldwide. Chris Patten the EU Commissioner for 
External Affairs describes the EU–Mercosur relationship as such:  
“What is at stake in the EU–Mercosur negotiations is the possibility for a 
strategic, political and economic alliance between the only two real common 
markets in the world…it will generate democratic development, growing prosperity  
and respect for human rights. Where prosperity reigns, democracy and human rights  
can take root. Beyond free trade and greater prosperity, we will have to overcome the 
problems of poverty, injustice and exclusion . . . Increasing business opportunity 
can never be an end in itself . . . It is the duty of governments to ensure 
that the benefits of these processes are widely shared.”72 
 
Given the state of affairs, the constructivist viewpoint insists that economic 
interests and identities are shaped through and during interaction.73 Even though doubts 
have been raised on whether the EU can sustain its approach, the fact that the foreign 
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policy of the EU is distinctive does not change. This is shown to be especially true in the 
Southern Cone, a region where both the U.S. and the EU have long had competitive 
interests. In this region, the EU’s trade investment strategies began to formulate new 
criteria towards growth and development.74 Regionalism brought countries together in 
formalized relationships across the North–South divide that have, in turn, sponsored 
informal networks of cooperation.75 As an example, trade and law treaties are very 
important symbolic and public demonstrations of an international commitment to certain 
laws and norms. These reforms are clear examples of how the constructivist idea of 
learning by doing provides for a way to see the progression of a European agenda on 
Latin America.                                                                                                                           
3.4 Honduras  
With the case studies of Honduras and Cuba, I will emphasize that despite 
continuous pressures and regional hardships, the EU has an opportunity to be a leading 
influence in the Latin American region and promote itself as an important actor in world 
politics. It will become evident that the most powerful of actors will be those that create 
opportunities. Throughout this section it is important to keep in mind that state actors and 
political structures are mutually constituted. Actors develop their relations with other 
actors through the media of norms and practices. “Constitutive norms define an identity 
by specifying the actions that will cause others to recognize that identity and respond to it 
accordingly.”76 What is important from a constructivist perspective is how an action does 
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or does not reflect on an actor; therefore the socialization of that actor becomes 
imperative.77  
There are several ways in which the EU attempts to be of influence in Honduras. 
Relations between the EU and Honduras are primarily based on the San José Dialogue 
launched in 1984. During that time, the entire Central American region was plagued by 
civil wars and general unrest. Summits, as new and innovative political solutions, 
therefore became vital proponents of change.78 Also, a contemporary aspect of European 
relations with Latin America is the Latin American, the Caribbean and the European 
Union Summit, a biannual meeting of heads of state and government. To be an action 
point to these summits and dialogues, the EU has certain focuses when dealing with the 
country. The European Commission names the Strategy of Influence a tool to promote 
mutual interests concerning Honduras. This tool includes interventions on priority areas 
of regional strategic importance such as trade and investment promotion, regional 
integration, education and training, social cohesion, information society, governance and 
civil society.79  
The June 2009 coup in Honduras has greatly ignited international negotiations in 
the country. After the coup, the United States was the first to act by suspending millions 
of dollars in development and military funds. The EU quickly followed suit with its own 
regulations.80 Just days after the conflict, the EU decided to temporarily suspend all non - 
humanitarian aid to the Central American state.81 The role the EU holds within this 
conflict will become an important step towards not only the unification of the region, but 
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the perception of the EU’s power, worldwide. The international community was seeking 
the return of ousted Honduran President Manuel Zelaya so that elections could be held in 
November. The possibility for the country to return to a constitutional path is of great 
concern for both the United States and the European Union. Unfortunately, Interim 
Honduran leader Roberto Micheletti has been unwilling to allow Zelaya's unconditional 
return. The possibility for the country to return to a constitutional path is of great concern 
for both the United States and the European Union.82 According to a statement by the 
European Council, “The EU highlights the importance of restoring the constitutionality 
and stability of the political and security situation in the country and underlines the 
importance of ensuring that fair, timely and transparent presidential elections are held in 
November 2009.”83 The condemnation of the illegitimate regime by Europe is clear. The 
words of Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt further expound on condemnation 
with, “The only difficulty is that there’s a president that shouldn’t be there.”84  
In order for the EU to be effective, it must be distinctive from U.S. policy areas in 
many ways. The cost and benefits offered by the EU could have considerable influence, 
although it will take time to see the clear effects. “Although not using the same 
terminology, constructivists have documented how compliance—especially at the elite 
level—is a game of cost/benefit analysis, with the diffusion of new social norms 
changing such calculations.”85 The importance of this situation is that discursive 
practices can be the means by which power relationships are maintained.86 With such a 
conflict it becomes evident that the importance of power relationships, or at least the 
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positive influence of good governance, norms and values on a political system, is of vital 
importance during any kind of uprising or dissolution of state. Although the European 
Union’s response to Honduras has not been drastically different from that of the U.S., its 
influences present within the negotiation processes will be of utmost importance.  
This conflict is best explained through the words of constructivists, “It is probably 
most useful to describe constructivism as based on a social ontology which insists that 
human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its 
collectively shared systems of meanings.”87 The fact remains that Latin America has in 
the past been influenced by the United States to promote change through coups. It is 
essential now for the EU to contest that norm through an insistence on democratic norms 
and constitution building. Petros Mavromichalis, EU representative for Central America, 
said "under the current circumstances it will be difficult to recognize the results of the 
elections, unless the situation (in Honduras) changes." The EU representative added that 
both sides must have some political will to find a satisfactory solution to the political 
crisis in their country, which has left Honduras in a difficult, vulnerable, socially violent 
and uncertain situation. "The current situation in Honduras is not the right one for holding 
free and democratic elections, that is why we (EU) have annulled participation through a 
delegation of electoral observers," said Mavromichalis who expected neighboring 
countries like Panama could play a more constructive role in helping solve the Honduran 
crisis.88  
Since the beginning of the conflict, the EU has repeatedly called for the 
restoration of constitutional rule in Honduras. The EU has been very clear about its 
                                                            
87 Risse 2004, 160 
88 Zhi 2009 
27 
 
stance against the coup.89 With the maintenance of EU norms and values and the 
accountability towards good governance, there is a hope and an expectation that with the 
right policy tools and sanctions, the Honduran situation will choose democratic norms.  A 
spokesperson for Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero released the following statement: 
"The head of the government expressed his strongest condemnation for the illegal 
detention and expulsion of the constitutional president of the Republic of Honduras, 
Manuel Zelaya. The solution to any dispute must always be found through dialogue and 
respect for democratic rules. There is not, neither can there ever be, a solution to the 
Honduran crisis outside the country's constitutional framework. The European Union 
hold firm that it would continue suspending aid until the crisis was resolved. 90 
The brief case of Honduras shows how difficult it is going to be to solve the crisis 
while also contributing to the advancement of democracy. The international community 
cannot opt for a short-term solution, but should instead encourage the construction of a 
more solid democracy through an agenda focused on democratic norms and governance. 
Because this conflict has the ability for international repercussions, the EU should focus 
its attention and remain aware of its responsibilities and its capacity for influence.91 In a 
post-American world, the United States knows it needs effective partners, and the EU has 
the ability to be the drive to democratic norms and ideals.    
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3.5 Cuba 
European influence in the communist state of Cuba is comprised of an agenda 
towards democratic goals and achievement.92 Despite evident ideological differences, the 
EU believes in sharing of democratic principles and norms with the country through any 
means, including the maintenance of political and economic ties. The EU believes that 
social practices have the power to reproduce entire communities, as they become 
propagators of dialogue and relations. These social practices within international actors 
can effectively discipline and police domestic norms and systems. The EU maintains the 
belief that state actions can be empowered positively by prevailing norms at home and 
abroad.  
EU policies towards Cuba are characterized by a series of principles respected by 
all member-states. In the first place, the EU rejects the U.S. embargo – condemning it 
institutionally and within the framework of the United Nations – as well as all types of 
economic sanctions. Secondly, the EU respects the national sovereignty and the right to 
self-determination. In the U.S., the dialogue partner is the opposition, or the Cuban 
Diaspora within the US. The EU however, maintains dialogue with the Cuban 
government itself. Thirdly, the EU has made the signing of future cooperation agreements 
conditional on visible democratic changes. Lastly, within the EU, Spain is dignified with 
the ability to promote change by exerting the greatest amount of influence over EU norms 
and policy towards Cuba.93  
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Along with Colombia and Venezuela, Cuba is the country that has received most 
attention in Latin American and Caribbean policy in the EU; it is the only Latin 
American country for which the EU approved a Common Position, in 1996.94 The main 
political objective of the Common Position is "to encourage a transition process towards 
a pluralist democracy and the respect of fundamental human rights and freedoms".
16 
The 
two specific components include: the linking of a cooperation agreement to visible 
progress towards democracy, and the distribution of development aid through European 
and Cuban NGOs.95 This Common Position on Cuba was the result of a series of specific 
political events. That year, President Clinton had passed the Helms-Burton Act in 
response to a wave of repression in Cuba, limiting U.S. involvement in the country. 
Consequently, the EU saw an opportunity to act and influence Cuba through dialogue. 
For this very reason, the EU did not opt to end dialogue, but instead it chose to keep 
communication channels open.  
The U.S. and the EU differ greatly with respect to their policies on Cuba. The two 
vary regarding economic instruments, the property ownership issue, national sovereignty, 
and the type of transition and democracy. Many claim that European investment and 
trade have helped Castro to stabilize his regime in terms of financial resources, while the 
U.S. sanctions policy – promoting the fear of an external enemy- has enabled him to 
justify his political ideology.96 Moreover, the EU made the decision to lift the diplomatic 
measures, adopted against Cuba in 2003, in order to facilitate the political dialogue 
process. This political dialogue increased to include a range of potential fields of 
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cooperation including political rights, human rights, and economic, scientific and cultural 
spheres. As stated, because of this economic engagement and conditional political 
dialogue, Cuba is one of the few countries in Latin America where the EU applies an 
active common policy to promote democracy. The EU has opted for a top-down approach 
in Cuba, which favors dialogue with the Cuban regime and identifies it as the main agent 
of political change. Given this, the EU has increased ability to influence the country 
towards democratic norms and values.97  
There have been a large number of statements and agreements that EU institutions 
have produced concerning Cuba. For example, the EU Commission has been clear in its 
promotion of the regional integration of Cuba in the Caribbean, Latin American and ACP 
context.98 Additionally, since October 2001, Cuba has been a member of CARIFORUM 
and has signed a 'partial scope' free trade zone agreement with CARICOM. EU 
proceedings concerning Cuba define the policy towards the country as one of 
‘constructive engagement’.99 This is true in terms of economy and cooperation, bearing 
in mind that Spain has become Cuba's largest trading partner, its main donor and the 
second largest investor in Cuba. However, the lifting of the 2003 diplomatic measures 
enabled a deepening of EU-Cuba dialogue and development cooperation. In addition, the 
EU agreed in June of 2009 to further pursue and deepen political dialogue.  
In February of 2008 the Cuban Parliament proclaimed Raul Castro President of 
the state’s highest governing body. This gave the EU a new chance for political 
engagement. The EU has since been working to re-establish a full political dialogue with 
                                                            
97 Gratius 2005, 2 
98 Roy 2007 
99 See European Union and Latin America, EU Online Portal  
31 
 
Havana ever since Fidel Castro stepped down from power. The attempt at better relations 
included the lifting of sanctions imposed on Cuba in 2003 in protest of the Cuban 
government's imprisonment of the dissidents. “Both sides have moved back closer to 
each other because they are both interested in resuming a normalization of relations,” said 
Bert Hoffmann from the Institute for Ibero-American Studies in Germany.100  
Today, the influence that the EU has towards Cuba is centered on Cuba’s 
relationship with the European country of Spain. Spain's historical and undisputedly 
intimate links with Cuba are of major significance as an influence towards Europeans 
norms and values. “A selective poll taken with EU officials and European diplomats with 
Cuban interests and duties places Spain in the first place in a ranking of EU Member 
States having influence in EU-Cuban affairs.”101 Therefore, from a constructivist 
perspective, since Spain has considerable influence in the government, the EU as a social 
actor can indirectly promote its own initiatives and agendas in the country. Here, I agree 
with Franck Debié, that traditional national diplomacy is an active aspect of EU foreign 
affairs. The EU as a body does not need to supersede this, but instead add to the already 
growing EU foreign policy.102 Even if the EU does not at all times agree with Spain’s 
initiatives, the fact that Spain is a key to the promotion of European values and norms is 
of considerable importance.  “A rejection of power politics and the pursuit of 
multilateralism and milieu goals are what the Member States can all agree on, though 
they may differ on the details of specific cases.”103 For the EU, this relationship is too 
crucial of an aspect. The country of Spain along with the EC is determined to place 
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political ideologies aside for the achievement of partnership goals.104 The EU is at 
present considering whether to adopt Spain’s dialogue-based approach, as having a 
political and economic presence, is the only way to promote the process of reform.105  
The EU believes that Cuba’s eventual transition to democracy can be pacific if the 
current regime sets in motion the process itself. Additionally, the ‘Spanish pre-transition’, 
can influence Cuba, as a great example of an effective democratic transition. Within 
Spain, this transition was initiated long before the actual process of a return to 
democracy.106 Many EU scholars hope Cuba will be a similar case. Some modern 
constructivists suggest that social learning and deliberation can lead to preference change. 
Further explanation shows that “in this view, the choice mechanism is instrumental…one 
of social interaction between agents, where mutual learning and the discovery of new 
preferences replace unilateral calculation.”107  The EU can influence Cuba as a ‘social 
actor’ and through its social norms, making it possible for a democratic social fabric to 
appear outside of the government and prepare for the conditions that could lead to future 
political change.108 
One of the biggest ways that the EU acts to influence Cuba is through the 
insistence of adherence to human rights and good governance.  The EU has, in the past, 
accused the Castro regime of violating human rights and fundamental freedoms. In 2003 
the European Commission opened an office in Havana, and just a few weeks later, the 
Cuban police arrested 75 dissidents and sentenced them to prison. For example, in this 
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case, Cuba and the EU resumed political dialogue only when Cuban Foreign Minister 
Bruno Rodriguez said the country had no political prisoners because all inmates had 
undergone due legal process. “The Council adopts this evaluation of the Common 
Position on Cuba. The Council will decide in June 2010 on the annual review of the 
Common Position including an assessment of the future of political dialogue, taking into 
account progress as to the elements of these Council resolutions, in particular in the field 
of human rights.”109As a consequence, the Commission rejected Cuba's application to 
join the Cotonou Agreement. The EU further battled the arrests by approving a list of 
‘minor sanctions’, reducing high-level visits and making it official policy to invite 
dissidents to national celebrations. Fidel Castro rejected these sanctions.110 Thus, the 
Cocktail Wars, of 2003-2006, created tense relations, but after the cession of Fidel 
Castro’s power, these strained relations improved. Despite these improved relations, the 
EU still has reservations about Cuba’s communist government. Cuba, on the other hand, 
desires for the EU to assume a more hands-off approach in its relations with them but the 
EU nonetheless insists on the progress towards democracy and human rights.111  Again, 
despite hesitations the EU demonstrates its influence through consistency and firmness. 
Good and effective daily practices will be both constructed and reproduced.  
Currently, the perspectives for the relationship between Cuba and the EU seem 
more open. Although relations have improved, EU External Relations Commissioner 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner asserts that, "There will be very clear language also on what the 
Cubans still have to do... releasing prisoners, really working on human rights questions." 
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There is considerable hope by the EU that diplomacy will be influential towards reform 
and democracy building in the country. From a constructivist perspective, the building 
blocks of international influence are formed on the bases of idea as well as material; 
ideational factors have normative influence as they express collective intentionality and 
can be highly influential.112 Thus, the influence of the EU on Cuba can socially construct 
a new, more democratic identity.                                                                                        
3.6 Conclusion 
With the end of the Cold War, the EU changed from being a part of an American 
dominated Western camp to a player in its own right. As European integration deepened, 
the EU’s standing in the international arena became more prominent. The EU has become 
a normative power that wields influence on a global scale through an assortment of soft 
power instruments, using a socially constructed, normative style of diplomacy to 
influence Latin America.  Presently, Latin America is employing a much wider scope of 
international relations, which include political, economic and military ties with 
counterparts as diverse as the EU, NATO, Japan, China and Iran. These partners provide 
investment, markets, finances, energy, arms, telecommunications and technology, 
amongst other things. All of these initiatives show the currently limited role of the USA 
in the Western Hemisphere and the existence of the EU as a power to establish 
institutions without its presence.113 As such, the EU has forged a truly new path and 
acquired a unique role in Latin America. 
 The preference for engagement is part of the EU’s rather distinctive 
international identity. Therefore I argued that the EU’s policies towards Latin America, 
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specifically in the promotion of European norms and values, good governance and 
regional integration, are distinctive and represent progress in forging a closer EU - Latin 
American engagement. This is contrasted against frequent foreign intervention and 
various human rights abuses committed by successive U.S. administrations; which have 
led to wide spread anarchy and discredited Western efforts to promote democracy in the 
region.  In light of this dubious past, it is clear that the time has come for Europe to 
utilize its new and more credible instruments in Latin America. If the EU had not been 
consistent in its policies and assertive in its guidance, then domestic and foreign policy in 
Cuba and Honduras would have been different. First, open dialogue between rogue states 
and democratic states would always remain primarily focused on U.S. hegemonic 
presence. Second, the influence of norms and values would not be of as great of an 
importance, preventing the gains in democratic building that those actors can make 
possible.  
It was my aim to identify the possibility of rogue actors to comply with the norms 
embedded in regimes and international institutions.  Norms matter as they shape interests 
and social learning. With the case studies of Honduras and Cuba, the evidence for change 
and successful regime change is still unknown; however the EU’s ability to affect norms 
and to generate pressures for compliance on state decision makers is of most importance. 
Constructivists believe that State interests and identities have the possibility to be shaped 
through and during interaction. As a result, mere contemporary success of EU interaction 
with Honduras and Cuba is not of main importance, but rather the long term ability of the 
EU, as a distinct actor, to use its tools to influence the norms and values of rogue 
36 
 
states.114 Through the export of good governance, elite interaction, and policy advice the 
EU endeavors to spread balanced economic growth, and political accountability. Its 
upcoming challenges will reflect on its ability to show unity and coherence as it responds 
to global challenges.  
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